Recovered and false memories by Wright, D. et al.
June 2006
352
The Psychologist Vol 19 No 6
Recovered and
false memories
IN 1995 the recovered memory debatewas near its most vociferous height.Hundreds of people were recovering
memories of childhood sexual abuse
(CSA), sometimes in therapies where it
was believed that repressed or dissociated
memories had to be recovered in order for
the person to ‘heal’. Many of the people
who recovered these memories confronted
the person whom they remembered abusing
them, and some cases ended up in the
criminal courts with successful prosecutions.
However, there were those who
questioned whether all such memories
should be accepted as accurate reflections
of real events (e.g. Loftus, 1993). It was
argued that some, perhaps even most, of
such recovered memories might in fact be
false memories produced, at least in part,
by the therapists themselves. In response 
to such concerns, bodies such as the
American Psychiatric Association and the
American Psychological Association issued
guidance to their members regarding the
potential dangers of unintentionally
implanting false memories in patients.
The argument is critical for the science
of memory, but also for thousands of
people who have either recovered
memories or have been accused of abuse
on the basis of such memories, not to
mention the families and friends of all
concerned. Against this backdrop, the
British Psychological Society’s Working
Party on Recovered Memories (WPRM)
published their report, recommendations,
and the results of a survey they conducted
with BPS accredited practitioners
(Andrews, Bekerian et al., 1995; Andrews,
Morton et al., 1995). 
However, in 1995 there was little direct
experimental evidence of the impact of so-
called ‘memory recovery’ techniques and
the relative ease with which some false
reports can be created. Much of the
evidence at that time was based on memory
studies not specifically designed to address
the recovered memory debate. Before 1995
there was much literature showing that
memories could be distorted (by
misinformation, by stereotypes, and so on),
but only a couple of studies on the creation
of false memories for entire events (e.g.
‘the mousetrap study’ by Ceci et al., 1994,
and ‘lost in the mall’, cited in Loftus,
1993) and a small literature on errors in
autobiographical memory (e.g. Conway,
1990). There were also some case studies
of memories for bizarre events (biologically
impossible events, alien abduction,
widespread Satanic ritual abuse). 
Since the publication of the WPRM,
there have been significant efforts directed
towards designing studies that are more
relevant to the recovered memory debate,
and more emphasis within some case
studies on investigating firstly the
veridicality of the memories and, secondly,
whether there had indeed been a period of
forgetting. We focus on some of this
research conducted since the publication 
of the WPRM. Owing to length constraints,
this is a selective review both in relation to
the topics chosen and the studies cited.
This selectivity is guided by our own
beliefs, which are not idiosyncratic to us;
many people on both so-called sides of the
recovered memory debate also share these
views. We believe:
● that what appear to be newly
remembered (i.e. recovered) memories
of past trauma are sometimes accurate,
sometimes inaccurate, and sometimes 
a mixture of accuracy and inaccuracy;
● that much of what is recalled cannot be
confirmed or disconfirmed;
● that, because of these two beliefs,
reports of past trauma based on such
recovered memories are not reliable
enough to be the sole basis for legal
decisions.
Our review covers four areas: adding 
entire events into a person’s autobiography;
forgetting memories; remembering
forgetting and forgetting remembering; and
using case studies. Further, we focus on
research with non-clinical (usually student)
populations. We do not cover the large
trauma/PTSD literature (for thorough
reviews see Brewin, 2003; McNally, 2003).
False reports of entire events
Before 1995 there were a couple of studies
showing that false events could be added to
people’s memories. With the eventual
publication of the ‘lost in the mall’ study
(Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), several
laboratories began showing that, with 
a little encouragement (see Ost, 2006), it
was possible for participants to come to
report relatively unusual events (e.g.
spilling a punchbowl at a wedding: Hyman
et al., 1995; putting slime in a teacher’s
desk: Lindsay et al., 2004), events
occurring in the first few days of life
(Spanos et al., 1999), medical procedures
that never happened (Mazzoni & Memon,
2003), and negatively charged events (e.g.
being attacked by a dog: Porter et al.,
1999). This even occurs with interviewers
who are trained in appropriate and non-
leading interview techniques (Ost et al.,
2005). It is easier to implant a memory 
for an event if the person believes that the
event is physically possible and also likely
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to happen (Pezdek et al., in press; Scoboria
et al., 2004). Of course, laboratory studies
are limited: within ethical constraints,
making somebody think that they were
attacked by a dog as a child (Porter et al.,
1999) may be about as traumatic an event
as can be added. This is an important point
and is a necessary limitation of laboratory
tasks. However, the case studies we discuss
later provide strong evidence that it is
indeed possible to implant false memories
of extremely traumatic events. 
Many researchers have also investigated
whether people differ in how susceptible
they are to such false memories (Read &
Winograd, 1998). One of the most
researched individual difference measures
in this area is dissociative tendencies, or
having difficulties integrating thoughts,
memories, images, and so on. In lay terms,
this is ‘spaciness’ and is closely related to
cognitive failures (Wright & Osborne,
2005). People who report much
dissociation are likely to be the most
susceptible to memory distortions in
experiments (e.g. Ost et al., 2005; Wright
& Livingston-Raper, 2001). Clearly, further
research is needed on the link between
dissociation and false reporting, especially
given that a tendency to dissociate is often
associated with a history of abuse (Brown
et al., 1998).
Forgetting memories for events
The term ‘recovered memory’ implies that,
at some point, the memory must have
become inaccessible to conscious
awareness (as opposed to being a
‘continuous memory’). Although this
terminology is not ideal, it is clear that
people often fail to report important events,
for example known hospitalisations
(Loftus, 1993). Several surveys of people
with documented childhood sexual abuse
have found that some of the people fail to
report this abuse. The most recent of these
surveys, by Goodman et al. (2003), found 
a non-disclosure rate of around 19 per cent.
The authors suggested that a lack of
willingness to disclose, as opposed to 
a lack of memory, was the most
parsimonious explanation for much of the
non-disclosure, but that some of the cases
may have arisen through forgetting (see
also McNally, 2003, for a comprehensive
review). Their data do not support the
claim that there is some special memory
mechanism responsible for forgetting about
these traumas.
However, prior to 1995, two special
mechanisms were generally put forward to
explain the inaccessibility of memories for
some events: repression and dissociation.
Repression has historically been a difficult
concept to define, and several incompatible
definitions exist. This led to strong
criticism of the concept and of the evidence
for it (Holmes, 1990). As a result, recent
investigations have focused on more
precise definitions of the concept, akin to
motivated forgetting (Brewin & Andrews,
1998). As for dissociation, the dissociative
amnesia model (Brown et al., 1998)
suggests that, rather than people
consciously or unconsciously ‘repressing’
memories, individuals learn to deal with
traumatic events by dissociating from them. 
There is less laboratory work on
forgetting memories (i.e. factors that may
reduce levels of reporting for witnessed
events) than there is on creating memories
(i.e. factors that may lead individuals to
report events that did not occur). The two
most relevant procedures are the directed
forgetting task and retrieval-induced
forgetting, which can be related to the
concepts of repression and dissociation,
respectively (see papers in Wessel &
Wright, 2004, for studies using both of
these procedures). We focus on retrieval-
induced forgetting. 
Anderson and colleagues (e.g. Anderson
& Spellman, 1995) have shown that re-
presenting some associated words from
lists of studied words decreases the
likelihood that other studied words will be
reported. They call this retrieval-induced
forgetting. Like studies (e.g. Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) showing that people
falsely report semantically related words,
the applicability of these studies to memory
for events may be limited (Freyd &
Gleaves, 1996), but important extensions
have been made. For example, Barnier,
Hung et al. (2004) found evidence of
retrieval-induced forgetting for positive,
negative and neutral autobiographical
events. Wright et al. (2001, 2005) showed
that re-presenting stories without certain
critical scenes lowered the likelihood that
these critical scenes were recalled. They
argued that this situation is analogous to
the situation where a perpetrator acts as if
the abuse has not occurred and that such
behaviour could make memories of the
abuse less accessible. 
Most of the studies examining
individual differences in forgetting have
examined what is called repressor
personality types. These are people who
state they are not anxious but show some of
the signs of being anxious (Myers, 2000).
Some of this research, for example studies
showing that repressors are less likely to
remember negative autobiographical
memories (Davis, 1987), was conducted
before 1995 and influenced the WPRM.
Several laboratories are now looking at
how repressors differ on different
laboratory tasks (Barnier, Levin et al.,
2004; Myers & Derakshan, 2004). 
While the results are complex, it is clear
that repressive coping style is related to the
failure to report negative stimuli in many
circumstances. Further research is needed
on the link between the repressive coping
style and non-reporting to gain a greater
understanding of the processes involved.
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Laboratory studies of memory are limited by ethical considerations – making up a childhood
dog attack may be about as traumatic an event as can be added
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However, as we will now show, conducting
research assessing the extent of non-
reporting is difficult, as people generally
lack a reliable metacognitive awareness
regarding their memory.
Remembering forgetting 
and forgetting remembering
Was there any moment today when you
forgot what you had for breakfast? This is
not a philosophical conundrum, but an
important question about people’s ability to
make metacognitive judgments about their
own memories. 
There are two aspects of these
metacognitive judgments that are important
for the recovered memory debate. The first
aspect relates to a question some mental
health professionals asked in order to help
them determine whether a client might
have experienced trauma as a child. They
would ask if there were any periods during
the client’s life for which they had few or
no memories (i.e. remembering forgetting).
If a client reported such gaps in their
memory this could suggest, to some, that
some traumatic event had caused these
periods of amnesia. The use of techniques
intended to uncover these supposed ‘hidden’
memories might then appear justified. 
However, Belli et al. (1998) wondered
whether the way this question was asked
could increase the likelihood that people
report memory gaps. They found that
participants who were asked to recall 
12 childhood memories (a difficult task)
subsequently rated their overall childhood
memory as being worse than participants
who were only asked to recall four such
events. Although the responses are likely 
to be based in part on people’s actual
autobiographical memory, they are
malleable (see also Brewin & Stokou,
2002). Thus, responses to this question are
liable to bias and are an unreliable way of
showing whether an individual really does
have atypical gaps in memory compared
with the general population.
The second aspect of these
metacognitive judgments is that people
often forget that they have previously
remembered an event. Merckelbach et al.
(2006) have conducted one of the most
important of these studies for the recovered
memory debate. They asked people to
report vivid memories for some childhood
events. After either a one-hour or a two-day
delay, they were asked if they had recently
thought about any of these events and
several others. Despite recalling the events
either an hour or a couple of days before,
many participants reported not having
thought about the events for years.
Critically, Merckelbach et al. compared
people reporting continuous memories of
CSA with those who reported recovered
memories of CSA. The people reporting
that they had recovered memories of CSA
were more likely to forget remembering the
recent events in their laboratory tasks. This
finding has important implications. Could
it be that these people had recalled the
CSA continuously (or at least fairly often),
but just forgot remembering it?
Case studies
Different types of case studies have been
used to illustrate the different processes
described above. Illustrating false
memories is simple. From biologically
impossible events (Wagenaar, 1996) to
alien abduction claims (e.g. French, 2003),
people clearly come to believe in events
that never occurred. Some well-
documented case histories exist, like
retractor cases against therapists (e.g.
Bennett Braun, Roberta Sachs – see Bikel
& Dretzin, 1995). These show that, without
the constraints of psychology ethics
committees, it is possible to create
memories for truly traumatic and abusive
events that did not occur. The number of
these case histories has increased
dramatically since 1995.
For methodological reasons, case
studies demonstrating recovered memories
of real events are more difficult to find.
While a memory for space abduction can
be taken as prima facie evidence of a false
memory, to show a true recovered memory
it is necessary to show that (a) the event
occurred, (b) the person could not
remember the event for a period
subsequently, and (c) the information
recovered could not have been gained 
from other sources (Schooler et al., 1997). 
The largest archive of cases consists 
of, at the time of writing, 101 cases of
‘corroborated recovered memories’ (Cheit,
2005). To be included, the case must have
‘strong corroboration’, but this can simply
mean testimony from other witnesses
(which can be problematic; see Garven et
al., 1998). Cases can also be included on
the basis of ‘corroboration of significant
circumstantial evidence’. In reading
through the cases, it appears being found
guilty in court is another form of
corroboration. Of course, both inclusion 
in Cheit’s archive and the court decision
should be based on other evidence. Critical
and detailed scrutiny of many of these
cases can lead to a sceptical view of the
accuracy of many of these memories.
Further, Cheit does not list not
remembering the event, and evidence for
this, as a criterion. This does not mean that
the all the cases on this list are not
examples of true recovered memories, only
that the requirements to be in this archive
are not as stringent as, for example, in
Schooler et al. (1997). Theirs is a smaller
archive, but one that we feel takes more
care to make sure, for example, that there
is a period of non-remembering. 
Still, even surpassing Schooler’s criteria
does not necessarily mean that the memory
is a true recovered memory. A case
discussed by both Cheit and Schooler, 
and reported in Corwin and Olafson
(1997), appeared to show a water-tight 
case of a true recovered memory. Corwin
and Olafson provided convincing evidence
of the abuse, and provided no reason to
doubt that it took place. However, when
Loftus and Guyer (2002a, 2002b) looked
more closely at the case it was clear that
Corwin and Olafson had left out
information that would have been useful to
most readers to decide how water-tight this
case was. It is worth reading the details
(which are all available on the web) to
make your own mind up about this
fascinating case. It is important to
remember that this is just a case study. If
you conclude that this case is not a water-
tight example of a true recovered memory,
this does not mean that some recovered
memories are not true. 
How will history judge us?
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DISCUSS AND DEBATE
What evidence is necessary to show a true
recovered memory?
How should the criminal courts treat recovered
memories?
What role has the media played in the recovered
memory movement over the past 20 years?
Have your say on these or other issues this article
raises. E-mail ‘Letters’ on psychologist@bps.org.uk or
contribute to our forum via www.thepsychologist.org.uk.
‘Was there any moment
today when you forgot what
you had for breakfast?’
Since 1995 and the BPS working party
report there has been much research on
reports of memories for events that have
allegedly been recovered after a long
period of non-remembering. The belief
that some of these claims are based on
events that did occur, some on events that
did not occur, and some a combination of
the two was held by us then, and research
over the past decade has provided much
evidence to support this view. We now
know events can be implanted into a
person’s autobiography, that some people
are more suggestible than others, that
particular techniques increase the
likelihoods memories can be implanted,
but also that most people will not believe
bizarre memories, at least after the
amount of persuasion applied in typical
laboratory studies. We also know more
about forgetting.
While research over the last few
decades has shown that presenting
contradictory evidence impairs memory,
recent work by Anderson and others
shows that presenting related material can
also impair memory. Similarly, while 10
years ago there was relatively little work
on meta-memory judgements, a vast
amount has been conducted recently. We
know not to take at face value statements
like: ‘I have not thought about that for
years’, and work my Merckelbach and
colleagues suggests those people with
recovered memories may have particularly
unreliable meta-memories. In summary,
10 years of data has not altered our
opinions, but has solidified them with
scientific evidence. Here we only scratch
the surfaces of large and sometimes
controversial areas of research.
Finally, it is important to consider 
the wider implications of the recovered
memory debate. Child sexual abuse is a
large societal problem, and children often
do not disclose abuse unless specifically
asked (London et al., 2005). The debate
about recovered memories should not be
used to deny these facts. What is
important for the discipline is how it 
has used science to inform this debate.
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